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NINE MONTHS OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
IN NORTH CAROLINA*
ALLEN K. SMITH**
A survey of the judicial operation of the North Carolina Indus-
trial Commission during the first nine months of its existence sheds
light on the future of Workmen's Compensation in North Carolina.
Operating under an act, which in the rush of legislation was inex-
pertly drafted as a compromise bill, the Industrial Commission has
functioned smoothly and has assumed that liberal viewpoint neces-
sary to the effective discharge of its duties. It is to be hoped that
subsequent legislatures will cure the statutory defects and that the
appellate tribunals will not tie the hands of the Commission. Cer-
tainly, if such aid is given, the Commission has laid the foundation
for a constructive future.
Accident Arising Out of and in the Course of Employment
As defined by §2 (f) an "injury" for which compensation is
allowed "shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the
course of the employment. . . ." This definition presents a double
aspect. "In the course of" refers to the time, place and circum-
stances under which the accident occurred. This is, in most cases,
a fairly simple question.' The real difficulty arises in determining
* All references to "Act," "Compensation Act" and "Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act" are to N. C. Pub. Laws (1929) ch. 120; and all references to sections
are to the sections under this statute.
** Student Editor-in-chief, NORTH CAROLINA LAW REvImw, 1929-30.1Injuries caused by a worker stepping aside from his work to engage in some-
thing personal do not arise in the course of employment. Piercy v. Henrietta
Mills, 1 N. C. I. C. 314 (1930) (spinner on night shift voluntarily left his work
to eat lunch and was injured on his return trip) ; Smith v. Neuse Veneer & Box
Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 317 (1930) (A, employed to feed a dry kiln, injured by a buzz
saw while cutting a board for a window light at his home).
Perplexing cases do sometimes arise on the question of "arising out of the
employment." Bradley v. Ozaer Mills, 1 N. C. I. C. 298 (1930) (employer en-
couraged doffer boys to leave building during idle periods; plaintiff injured by
falling from an outside platform during an idle period, compensation allowed).
Another perplexing case: A, prior to reporting for work, assisted in taking
home a person who had fainted. Upon returning to the factory and thinking
that he was late for work, A ran up the stairs leading to the fifth floor, stumbled
on the stairway on the third floor and was injured. Compensation was allowed.
Jones v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 17 (1929). For collections
of cases on this subject see the following: Note (1920) 6 A. L. R. 1151 (in-
juries during lunch hour) ; Note (1923) 24 A. L. R. 1233 (injuries while riding
to and from work in the employer's conveyance) ; Note (1927) 49 A. L. R. 424(injuries while entering or leaving the place of employment).
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whether the accident is one "arising out of the employment." That
this is considered as a mixed question of law and fact makes the
problem all the more difficult. 2 In the final analysis it means that
there must be apparent "to the rational mind, upon consideration of
all the circumstances, a catisal connection between the conditions
under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting
injury."3 For instance, an injury occasioned by an assault of a co-
employee and growing out of differences in regard to the employ-
ment was held to be within the definition.4 But where the assault
grew out of personal malice unconnected with the employment, no
compensation was awarded.5 In the further case of an unprovoked
assault by a third person upon an employee, the risk having arisen
out of the employment, a recovery was allowed.0 Moreover, if the
injury occurs from a prank played by a fellow workman, compen-
It is interesting to note that a common law remedy was suggested by Com-
missioner Allen in both the Piercy and Smith cases, supra. He suggested that
"if the master has failed in its duty to explain the hazards and dangers con-
nected with the business, and failed to take ordinary care to protect him from
risks, which he [a minor in both cases] could not appreciate, the master is
subject to the same liability as if the child were not a servant or employee, and
the claimant may have a remedy at common law based upon a duty to him as a
licensee." It would seem that under §§10 and 11 of the North Carolina Act the
common law remedy would be abrogated. Moreover, it appears from the last
sentence in the first paragraph of §11 and also from §2(b) that even when
unlawfully employed the minor shall recover compensation "the same and to
the same extent as if said employee was an adult." By the prior provision of
§11 this remedy would seem to be exclusive. But this is not the usual view.
Note (1921) 14 A. L. R. 818; Note (1924) 33 A. L. R. 337; Note (1927) 49
A. L. R. 1435; Note (1929) 60 A. L. R. 847.
Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 20 (1929).
Re Annie McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697, L. R. A. 1916A. 306, 307
(1913), in which it is further stated: "The causative danger must be peculiar
to the work, and not common to the neighborhood. It must be incidental to the
character of the business and not independent of the relation of master and
servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must
appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to
have followed from that source as a rational consequence."
' Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., supra note 2; Anner v. Johnson Rayon
Mills, Inc., 1 N. C. I. C. 245 (1930) ; Note (1921) 15 A. L. R. 588, 590. For
injuries growing out of labor trouble see Notes (1921) 13 A. L. R. 549 and
(1924) 31 A. L. R. 1085.
'Harden v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 131 (1929), affd by
Full Commission in 1 N. C. I. C. 217 (1930). This accords with the majority
view. Note (1921) 15 A. L. R. 588, 594.
° McDade v. Raleigh-Hopewell Ice & Coal Co., 1 N. C. ,. C. 73 (1929) (the
assailant worked for a customer of the defendant Ice Cc.) ; Note (1921) 15
A. L. R. 588, 595. But see Note (1924) 29 A. L. R. 437, 445.
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sation is given.7 But if the injured employee engaged in the play,
no recovery is permitted. 8
Whether the injury arose "out of" the employment was vividly
presented in the following case. A, a nightwatchman, while making
his rounds, saw a car drive into his employer's canal, which was the
source of water supply. A notified the shop foreman, made some
more rounds, and finally entered the water, was caught by the cur-
rent and drowned. There was testimony that A knew that if the car
was not removed, it would interfere with the running of the mill. In
the absence of evidence that A's sole purpose was one of rescue, it
was held, despite A's use of bad judgment, that compensation should
be allowed since a night watchman is primarily charged with pre-
serving the employer's property.9
In the following case the servant's deviation from the strict course
of employment was considered slight and it was held that he was still
executing his master's business. A, a delivery boy, was supposed to
stay on the job continually and to get his meals at the store. He was
called to make a trip by motorcycle that carried him close to his home
at the dinner hour. While on the trip he went by his home and ate
dinner. On returning to business by the most direct route he suf-
fered an accident, resulting in death.10 This case seems to be in
accord with the view heretofore expressed by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina' and other appellate tribunals.' 2
In Ballard v. Cannon Mills Co.'a the question was raised for the
first time whether or not compensation could be allowed for the
acceleration and aggravation by an injury of a preexisting disease.
Plaintiff was suffering from syphilis prior to the injury. The injury
'Chambers v. Union Oil Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 221 (1930).
'Starnes v. Flint Mfg. Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 239 (1930) ; Note (1921) 13 A. L.
R. 540; Note (1922) 20 A. L. R. 882; Note (1925) 36 A. L. R. 1469; Note
(1926) 43 A. L. R. 492; Note (1927) 46 A. L. R. 1150.
" Southern v. Morehead Cotton Mills Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 65 (1929), aff'd. by
Full Commission in 1 N. C. I. C. 200 (1930). For a general treatment of in-
juries sustained by night watchmen, see Notes (1920) 6 A. L. R. 578 and
(1921) 13 A. L. R. 512.
"Peppers v. Wiggins Drug Stores, Inc., 1 N. C. I. C. 164 (1929).
'Duncan v. Overton, 182 N. C. 80, 108 S. E. 387 (1921).
Ritchie v. Waller, 63 Conn. 155, 27 L. R. A. 161 (1893) and note.
Ballard v. Cannon Cotton Mills, 1 N. C. I. C. 107, 112 (1929), in which the
Commissioner stated: "The Workmen's Compensation Act, the Courts of otherjurisdictions time and again have stated, must be construed liberally, and this
is always in the mind of the Commissioner in arriving at a decision in a claim
for compensation." The case was affirmed by the Full Commission in, 1 N. C.
I. C. 215 (1930).
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was slight, having been caused by a box 'being pushed against the
plaintiff's ankle. The testimony of the doctor was that the injury
was the exciting cause of the disability, that the accident inflamed
into activity, aggravated and accelerated the disease. The Commis-
sion allowed compensation.14 In doing so it recognized that decisions
in other states were not harmonious, but professed to follow the
weight of authority in England15 and in this country.' 6 As a social
matter the instant holding finds support.
Disease Resulting Naturally and Unavoidably from the Accident
The definition of injury given in §2 (f) also provides that it
"shall not include a disease in any form, except where it results
naturally and unavoidably from the accident." In applying this to
the following case the Commission evinced a willingness to con-
strue definitions liberally. Plaintiff, a truck driver, sustained an in-
jury to his eye while cleaning a carburetor. The injury irritated his
eye and resulted in ulcer. Seven days after the accident the plaintiff
was treated by a doctor, who gave the plaintiff some lotion to use.
He visited the doctor three times. Then gonorrhea opthalmia showed
up, which was on the thirteenth day after the accident. As a result of
the infection the plaintiff lost one eye and suffered a partial loss of
use in the other eye. Compensation was allowed. 17 The Commission
said that the disease was "natural" because one infection opened the
way for other infections. There was more trouble with the word
"unavoidably." The Commission quotes from the opinions rendered
in other jurisdictions to illustrate that "unavoidably" does not mean
"absolutely inescapable,"' 8 but that "a thing is generally considered
unavoidable -when common prudence and foresight cannot prevent
it."'1 And since no evidence was presented that the plaintiff had been
careless, and since the plaintiff had no reason to suspect a possible
"' "In this class of cases, where compensation is claimed on the ground that a
preexisting disease has been aggravated by injury resulting from an accident
arising out of and in the course of the employment, to justify an award the
evidence must be clear and satisfactory, both as to the facts of the accident and
also in relation to the scientific or medical question of aggravation of the pre-
existing disease or infirmity." Logan v. Elliott Building Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 90,92 (1929). This seems to be the generally adopted view. Note (1922) 19 A. L.
R 95; Note (1924) 28 A. L. R. 204.
'Willoughby v. Great Western Ry. Co., 117 L. T. 132 (1904) (locomotor
ataxia).
"Excellent Note (1929) 60 A. L. R. 1300, 1310.
"Williams v. Thompson, 1 N. C. I. C. 124 (1929).
'In re MacLauchlan, 9 F. (2d) 534, 535 (C. C A. 2nd, 1925).
"U. S. Casualty Co. v. Smith, 34 Ga. App. 363, 129 S. E. 880, 885 (1925).
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infection of this nature, the disease was found to have resulted un-
avoidably from the accident. This liberal construction tends to ef-
fectuate the general purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act.2 0
Independent Contractor, Subcontractor, Casual Employee, Employee
Under Concurrent Contracts
The Workmen's Compensation Act did not abrogate the doctrine
of the independent contractor. "One who contracts to do a specific
work, hires and controls his assistants, and executes the work entirely
in accordance with his own ideas, or with a plan previously given
him by the person for whom the work is done, without being subject
to the latter's orders in respect to details of the work, is not a servant
or employee, but is an independent contractor, and not subject to the
Workmen's Compensation Act."'2 1 This pronouncement of the Com-
mission is in accord with the view of the North Carolina Supreme
Court.2 2 Somewhat of a limitation is placed upon this doctrine by
§19 of the act in respect to subconfractors. This section provides
that a principal contractor, immediate contractor or subcontractor
who sublets a contract without securing a certificate that the.subcon-
tractor has insured his liability in the prescribed manner, is liable to
the same extent as the subcontractor. This section further provides
that in any action thereunder the award "shall fix the order in which
said parties shall be exhausted [sic], beginning with the immediate
employer." An award in such a situation made the immediate em-
ployer liable in first order, the insurance carrier of the principal con-
tractor liable in second order, and the principal contractor liable in
third order, each with full liability.23
Employment is not casual because intermittent. The Commission
has said: ". . . we must conclude that the legislature did not con-
' Compensation is usually held to be allowable where there is a subsequent
incident or injury if its consequences are the natural result of the original in-
jury. Note (1920) 7 A. L. R. 1186.
'
1 Williams v. Kitchen Lumber Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 209, 211 (1930). (Plaintiff
was paid by piecework for cutting cross ties; he employed others to assist him,
the defendant exercising no supervision over the work; held, plaintiff was an
independeriE contractor). Where the pieceworker is subject to the control of the
employer, the pieceworker is considered an employee rather than an independent
contractor. Note (1925) 38 A. L. R. 839.
For an exhaustive consideration of the cases showing the circumstances
under which the relationship of employer and independent contractor is predi-
cable see, Note (1922) 19 A. L. R. 1168-1361.
' Midgett v. Banning Mf'g. Co., 150 N. C. 333, 340, 64 S. E. 5 (1909) ; Craft
v. Albemarle Timber Co., 132 N. C. 152, 158, 43 S. E. 597 (1903).
" Grant v. Allen, 1 N. C. I. C. 15 (1929). On the general subject of pro-
visions for employees of subcontractors see, Note (1929) 58 A. L. IL 872.
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template an employment to be continuous in order to bring it within
the Act, as they certainly would not enact a statute with such require-
ments that common knowledge would show to be a, nullity under
such construction. '24 Employment that is definite, whether for a
day or for a year, is not casual. 25
The Act does not expressly recognize the right of an employee
under concurrent contracts with two or more employers to recover
from the employer liable on the basis of the entire amount of wages
earned.26 It was held that in the absence of an express recognition
of such a right, the loss of wages "must be measured by the impair-
ment of his earning in the employment in which he was working at
the time of the accident."2 7 The Commission recognizes that this
rule works a handicap in some cases, but denies itself the privilege,
when the claimant was regularly employed at an ascertained wage, of
abandoning the rule and exercising the discretion contained in §2 (e)
to determine the amount "the injured employee would be earning
were it not for the injury.'28
Partial Disability But No Impairment of Earning Power
The question has been raised whether or not the loss of a member,
for which there is no specific provision, is compensable in the absence
of proof of loss of earning power. It was answered in the negative.2 9
There seems to be no doubt but that the theory of compensation is
"Aycock v. Cooper, 1 N. C. I. C. 290, 292 (1930).
'Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 41 (1929). By §14(b) and
§2(b) the act does not apply to casual employees. But in §2(e) it is provided
that where because of the short duration of the employment or casual nature or
terms of the employment it is impractical to compute the average weekly wage
a different mode of reckoning may be used. Yet this seeming conflict appears
not to have been brought to the Commission's attention.
' Provision is made in §50 for compensation when the employee "shall at
the time of the injury be in joint service of two or more employers subject to
this act, such employers shall contribute to the payment of such compensation
in proportion to their wage liability to such employee."
w Mills v. Transylvania Tanning Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 189 (1929).
,' This particular portion of §2(e) reads as follows: "But where for excep-
tional reasons the foregoing [average weekly wage] would be unfair, either to
the employer or to the employee, such other methods of computing average
weekly wages may be resorted to as will most nearly approximate the amount
which the injured employee would be earning were it not for the injury."
An award based on the full salary was allowed, however, where the injured
person was jointly employed by two school boards. Parsons v. Boards of Edu-
cation of Ashe and Watauga counties, 1 N. C. I. C. 264 (1930).
' Porter v. Jennings Cotton Mills, 1 N. C. I. C. 218 (1930) (loss of a
testicle, no impairment of physical and sexual power). Nor would there seem
to be a disfigurement in the sense that word is used by the Commission. Hen-
ninger v. The North Carolina Industrial Commission, 1 N. C. I. C. 3 (1929).
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based upon the impairment of the capgcity to earn a livelihood.3 0
The instant case, however, presents a rather exceptional situation.
And in fact some courts have allowed a recovery upon the theory
that loss of earning power is not the criterion of w disability partial
in character and permanent in quality.3 1 In the instant case the
Commission states that some jurisdictions seem to hold that in such
a case the Acf is not exclusive and the claimant may have recourse to
a common law action. No authority is cited in support of this sug-
gestion and such a view is contrary to the spirit of compensation laws.
Settlement With a Third Party
By the language of §11 of the Act "either the acceptance of an
award hereunder, or the procurement of a judgment in an action at
law, shall be a bar to proceeding further with the alternate remedy."
It would seem that by inadvertence no provision was inserted to bar
the employee in the event he made a settlement with a third party-
tort-feasor. (Another defect of a minor nature in this section has
been pointed out before.)" 2 That the Commission has construed the
Act to include a settlement3 3 is rather a tribute to its liberal policy,
for under a strict interpretation a double recovery by the injured
employee would be possible. An interesting case8 4 of almost double
recovery was presented to the Commission and it deemed itself unable
to remedy the situation. A deputy sheriff, while searching for a
still, was shot from ambush and wounded in the leg. The ambushers
were indicted, brought to trial, and a suspended judgment rendered.
The judgment of the criminal court, dated July, 1929, recited that the
sum of $2,000.00 was paid in the presence of the court to the plaintiff
(meaning the prosecuting witness) by the ambushers. In August,
1929, the deputy sheriff and the county entered into an agreement
for compensation. Pursuant thereto the insurance carrier paid $414
for compensation and $526.75 for medical and hospital bills. On
December 27, 1929, the insurance carrier requested permission to stop
"For instance pain and suffering are not allowed to be figured as items of
compensation. Watson v. Cannon Mills Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 58 (1929).
"Hercules Powder Co. v. Morris County Court, 93 N. J. L. 93, 107 AtI. 433
(1919) ; Kostida v. Dep't. of Labor and Industries, 139 Wash. 629, 247 Pac. 1014
(1926) (loss of testicle held compensable under the clause of the local statute,
"or any other injury known in surgery to be permanent partial disability.")
-A Survey of Statutory Changes in IV. C. (1929) 7 N. C. L. REv. 363, 409
n. 18.
"Wood v. Central Carolina Fair Asso., 1 N. C. I. C. 235 (1930).
Pfaff v. Forsyth County, 1 N. C. I. C. 270 (1930). But quaere is the
deputy sheriff the employee of the county or of the sheriff.
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further payments. Permission was granted. At the hearing the
-deputy sheriff claimed that he did not receive the money from the
.ambushers until December. It was determined that the full amount
-the deputy would have been entitled to under the Act was $2,103.55.
In upholding the privilege to cease further payments the Commission
stated that it must be assumed, although the judgment of the criminal
vcourt does not recite the purpose for which the $2,000 was paid, that
"'it was in full satisfaction of the rights and remedies the plaintiff
<the deputy sheriff) had against his assailants-certainly not for the
failure to prosecute the felony charge against them." Then it is fur-
"ther stated: "This Commissioner has no authority to direct or order
that the plaintiff reimburse the defendants (insurance carrier) this
overpayment of $837.20; and as to the defendants being estopped by
the judgment of the July term, 1929, in Criminal Court, from pro-
ceeding against the third parties for its collection, presents a question
for another tribunal."
Section 11 might be construed to deny compensation to an em-
-ployee who had received a settlement from the third party who caused
-the injury, but to deny to the third person, who paid for the supposed
-discharge, the power to set this fact up by way of defense to the
'laims of the employer who, in ignorance of the settlement, paid
-compensation. This is not quite a paradox. The employee should
not be allowed a double recovery. The employer paying compen-
sation should not be denied his remedy against the third person who
made the settlement. To allow the settlement with employees (often
secured through the improvidence and ignorance of the injured em-
ployee) to exonerate the third party-tort-feasor would deny to the
-employer paying compensation the full protection contemplated by
the act in such a situation, for settlements are not always as much as
,compensation would be. It would seem that when a third party takes
a release or settles a claim, he should secure the approval of the per-
son or corporation liable for compensation, and that failure to do so
-should destroy the effect of the release as a defense to a claim by an
employer who had paid compensation for the same injury.3 5
"The effect of the employee receiving payments from or settling with third
persons is usually determined by the particular provisions of the local compen-
sation act. The general view, however, is that the employer is not deprived of
his right of action for damages against the third party. Note (1922) 19 A. L.
R. 766, 788.
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Dependency
By §39 a conclusive presumption of dependency is raised in the'
cases of a widow, a widower, and/or a child.30 The presumption is.
that they are wholly dependent. The existence of one wholly de-
pendent excludes from compensation any of the partial dependents..
Determination of the extent of the dependency of partial dependents
has proven troublesome. It is stated in §39: "In all other cases ques-
tions of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined ivr
accordance with the facts as the facts may be at the time of the acci-
dent; but no allowance shall be made for any payment made in liet:
of board and lodging or services, and no compensation shall be al-
lowed unless the dependency existed for a period of three months or
more prior to the accident." 87 The case of Griffin v. McLellair
Stores38 shows the difficulty of applying this quoted section. A was
stabbed to death by a shop lifter. A turned over to his mother each
week his weekly 'salary of $19. She gave him $4 each week for
spending money and purchased his clothes out of the family fund.
A paid no board. The mother, the responsible head of the family,.
with this aid from her son, and by taking in roomers, supported the
family including a husband and two or three minor children. The
holding of the Commission that a claim of dependency, for the pur-
pose of compensation, is not defeated by a showing that the claimant
could support himself by his own unaided efforts, seems to be cor-
rect.89 But the holding that the mother was a partial dependent to,
"The term child includes an illegitimate child who is an acknowledged de-
pendent. Peak v. City of Salisbury, 1 N. C. I. C. 142 (1929). Section 2 (L)
also includes within the term child a posthumous child, a child legally adopted
prior to the accident and a stepchild. But it excludes married children unless.
wholly dependent. By §2(n) the term widow includes only the decedent's wife
and by interpretation this has been held to exclude a claimant purporting to be
a common law wife by a union in this state. Reeves v. Parker-Graham Sexton:
Inc., 1 N. C. I. C. 277 (1930). To warrant payment to a surviving spouse it
must be shown that the applicant was married to the deceased before the date
of the injury and that the marriage was such as the lex loci recognized. To
permit any other procedure would be to open the door "to false pretenses of
marriage and would invite and encourage impostors to contest the claims of
helpless dependents."
"The Commission has taken occasion to discourage the claims of adminis-
trators appointed subsequent to an award to dependents. An award prior to.
the appointment of an administrator is not res fudicata as to him, but when
there has been an award to persons found to be dependent, the administrator
cannot recover. Therefore, such claims of the personal representatives merely
burden the Commission with extra business and hearings. Smith v. Carolina
Power & Light Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 172 (1929).
"1 N. C. I. C. 144 (1929).
"Dependency does not mean distress nor does it mean a reduction of ex-
penses below a reasonable standard of living. Lumbermen's Reciprocal Asso. r.
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the entire extent of the wages of her son seems to override the facts
,of the case. The Commission recognized the logic of defendant's
claims but said "our law does not purport to provide a method to
,determine the actual loss sustained by such a parent" and "there is
no provision in the North Carolina Act for any such deduction and
no language from which such requirement can be inferred." A
liberal construction of the quoted section would have led to a recog-
nition that at least the spending money allowance should be consid-
-ered as an item which the son did not contribute to the family treas-
ury. Ii should be considered not as a reduction but rather an item
mot contributed.
Recovery by Personal Representative When No Dependents
The last sentence in §29 reads: "In case of death the total sum
paid shall be six thousand dollars less any amount that may have been
-paid as partial compensation during the period of disability, payable
in one sum to the personal representative of deceased." The other
portion of this section provides for compensation for total disability
at the 60% rate, with the $7 and $18 weekly limits, for not more
than 400 weeks and for not over $6,000. The quoted sentence was
.considered by Commissioner Dorsett in Smith, administratrix v.
'Carolina Power and Light Co.,40 and was held to be ambiguous, not
specific, inoperative and void. Construed alone with the prior pro-
visions of §29 it is either meaningless or a life insurance in the sum
of $6,000. The latter construction is obviously at variance with the
purpose of the whole act. Moreover, it is at variance with and con-
flicts with §38, which deals with survivors wholly and partially de-
-pendent, and with §40 which deals with the amount payable to the
personal representative when no dependents exist. On an appeal to
the full Commission the holding was affirmed. And in a still later
case Commissioner Wilson speaks of §29:
Warner, 245 S. W. 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Pushor v. American Ry. Ex.
Co., 149 Minn. 308, 183 N. W. 839 (1921) ; Dazy v. Apponaugh Co., 36 R. I. 81,
89 Atl. 160 (1914) ; Appeal of Hotel Bonding Co., 89 Conn. 143, 93 Atl. 245
(1915).
For a general collection of cases on the subject of whole and partial de-
pendency see, Note (1921) 13 A. L. R. 686; Note (1924) 30 A. L. 1. 1253;
Note (1925) 35 A. L. R. 1066; Note (1928) 53 A. L. R. 218; Note (1929) 62
A. L. R. 160.
"1 N. C. I. C. 117 (1929). This ruling of the Commission was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of North Carolina. Smith v. Carolina Power & Light Co.,
198 N. C. 614, 152 S. E.-(1930) (the first reported decision of the Supreme
Court on the Compensation Act).
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"But said amender left the realm of compensation, which in prin-
ciple provides for those who are dependent and says that six thou-
sand dollars shall be paid to the personal representative, which means
that the money would be distributed according to law, and not accord-
ing to dependency. Dependents would share equally with others of
equal kin." 41
The direct question of whether a personal representative could
recover under the Act when there were no dependents arose later.
A, an employee, left surviving him his father, stepmother, two
brothers, one sister, three half brothers and one half sister, none of
whom were either wholly or partially dependent on the intestate.
A's weekly wage was $22. The award allowed "the commuted
amount of $13.20 compensation for three hundred and fifty weeks,
less the burial expenses."42 In arriving at this conclusion Commis-
sioner Wilson had to sustain §40, which provides: "If the deceased
employee leaves no dependents the employer shall pay the personal
representative of the deceased the commuted amount provided for in
§38 of this act, less the burial expenses which shall be deducted there-
from." One reason for declaring this section valid was thus stated
by the Commissioner: "It was placed there to help eliminate an evil
that has grown up as a result of compensation laws, to wit: dis-
crimination against employees with large families and dependents."4 3
The legislative debates are cited to support this view and to indicate
the legislative intent. The legislative intent and the words of §40
"make it difficult to place the proper construction." In §40 there is a
reference to the commuted amount provided by §38. But §38 has no
reference to commuted amount except as it refers to aliens. Since
§44 stipulates how any and all future compensation may be commuted,
the Commissioner decided that compensation payable under §38 can
be commuted in accordance with §44. In determining the amount
payable the Commissioner saw that §38 provided rules for figuring
compensation for (1) those wholly dependent, (2) partial dependents
and (3) aliens. The third rule was discarded. The first rule was
adopted because under the second rule it "would never know how to,
figure same, because it is not based upon known facts." A defect in
this method was apparent to the Commissioner.
"Freeman v. B. & N. Motor Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 283, 285 (1930).
'Supra note 41.
' In making this statement the Commissioner prefaced his remarks by stat-
ing that the "original section 40 provided funeral benefits for a deceased
employee who left no dependents, and $500.00 payable to the Commission to
be used for rehabilitation purposes."
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"We realize full well that with this interpretation another evil
will be set up that will to a degree, offset the remedy. That is, where
there is partial dependency of limited proportions, a temptation will
be created to deny such partial dependency for the greater recovery.
Often this will probably mean less for the actual partial depe'dent
or dependents." 44
On an appeal from the opinion of the single Commissioner his
opinion and award were adopted as the "Award and Opinion of the
Full Commission." 4 5 In arriving at this conclusion it was observed,
to the objection that the legislature had not fixed a rule in deter-
mining the commuted amount, that under §54 of the Act the Com-
mission had been delegated the power to make rules consistent with
the Act and that in pursuance thereof it had fixed the rate of discount
to be used in arriving at lump sum settlements. As a final reason
for affirmance it is stated:
"As we see it, §40 is not inconsistent with or repugnant to §38,
and if the legislature has expressed its intention in the law itself with
certainty, the Commission has no right to depart from that intention
or any extraneous consideration or theory of construction." 46
Commissioner Dorsett dissented from the opinion of the Commis-
sion.a7 His first contention was that since §11 attempts to make the
right under §40 exclusive as to all rights of the employee and others,
including his personal representatives, at common law or otherwise,
and since §77 repeals all prior acts and parts of acts inconsistent
therewith, it might seem to repeal the statutory remedy provided for
wrongful death.48 But since it does not do so specifically, it would
require an act clear and unambiguous in terms and covering the whole
matter of the antecedent act.4 9 Commissioner Dorsett points out that
the "Act as a whole is for the purpose of compensating injured em-
ployees or their dependents for injuries or death attributable to in-
dustrial accidents." 50 He then attempts to show that §40 is vague,
indefinite and ambiguous, and therefore, void, citing the same section
used by the majority opinion in construing §40. He further points
"Supra note 41 at 287.Freeman v. B. & N. Motor Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 324 (1930).
"Supra note 45 at 327.
"This is the first reported dissent.
"N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §160.
Winslow v. Morton, 118 N. C. 486, 24 S. E. 417 (1896).
" This is emphasized by the statement that under no other state acts is there
a provision similar to the one in the North Carolina Act.
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out that the commuted amount does not mean compensation, that the
majority rule will have trouble with §36,51 that if the insurance rates
are high the present view will necessitate the higher rates, and that
he does not anticipate the discrimination against employees with de-
pendents. The dissenting view contends that under the majority
interpretation the payment would not be compensation, that §21 ex-
empting compensation from the claims of the creditors would not
apply, that the payments would be open to claims of creditors of the
deceased, and that the result would be contrary to the wrongful death
statute which exempts the recovery from creditors' claims and that
the result would make the industries the virtual insurers of the debts
of their employees.52
While the views of the dissenting opinion are unanswerable on
the subject of the advisability of deleting §40 by legislative repeal,
the majority view appears to be correct in holding that the Industrial
Commission should make every effort to carry into effect the terms
of the Act. Although the majority opinion had to effectuate §40 by
devious references to other sections, this process is not in itself ob-
jectionable. That §40 is the product of hurried legislation (perhaps
unavoidable) seems obvious. The Industrial Commission seems to
have chosen a wise plan in making the best of a bad situation rather
than in attempting to avoid it by declaring the section void -and in-
operative.53
Appeal
On the question of appeal from the Commission's award §60 pro-
vides: "The award of the Commission ... if not reviewed in due time,
or an award of the Commission upon review shall be conclusive and
binding as to all questions of fact, but either party ... may within
"§36 provides for payment of compensation to the dependents only of a
deceased employee, when the death occurred outside of the state.
' This argument of the dissent seems to be directed to the point that the
allowance of a commuted amount is not in accord with the spirit of the Act.
The argument would certainly not be very creditable if it meant to suggest that
the windfall to the non-dependent next of kin should be exempt from the
claims of creditors of the deceased. If the personal, representative of a de-
ceased employee is allowed a recovery under the Act, social desirability demands
that such a sum be subject to the claims of creditors.
' In Smith v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 198 N. C. 614, 621, 152 S. E.-
(1930), there is a dictum which tends to indicate that the Supreme Court would
uphold §40: "Sections 3.8 and 40, in clear and comprehensive detail, provide a
legal method of determining compensation for fatal injuries. The last clause
of section 29 is totally repugnant to the definite method of settlement prescribed
in sections 38 and 40."
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thirty days... appeal.., to the Superior Court ... for errors of law
under the same terms and conditions as govern appeal in ordinary civil
actions." The Act does not specify the particular steps in the appeal.
Since the Commissions findings of fact are conclusive, there would
seem to be no necessity to send up on appeal to the Superior Court
any part of the usually lengthy record. Apparently, it would be suf-
ficient to send up the decision of the Commission, which includes a
statement of the facts of the case, the conclusions of law and the
award. There would seem to be no necessity for the Superior Court
Judge to examine the record since the findings of fact by the Com-
mission are conclusive. The question presented by the consideration
of whether or not the Commission's findings of fact would be con-
clusive and binding in case there was no evidence to support them
stands at the threshold of a consideration of appeal. If the words
of the statute did not include such a situation, then there would be
instances in which it would be necessary to bring up the record on
appeal. But the section quoted above seems to be broad enough to
cover this possibility and to deny the appellate courts this power of
review.
Would it be necessary in an appeal from the Superior Court to
the Supreme Court to include in the statement of case on appeal more
than the opinion of the Commission, the judgment of the Superior
Court on the questions of law, and the assignment of errors as to
the rulings of law? The usual statement of case on appeal from a
trial court includes: (1) a short statement of the facts of the case
and the trial history; (2) the evidence, or pertinent parts thereof,
with the exception indicated; (3) the request for instruction with
the exception to the granting or refusal indicated; (4) the charge of
the judge as signed by him if there be an exception thereto; (5)
assignments of error alleged. 54 It is obvious that (3) and (4) will
never be a part of the record for the questions of fact are determined
by the Commission. Since the facts are so determined and since the
proceedings before the Commission are simple, summary and devoid
of technicalities, 55 it would seem that (2) should find no place in the
"N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §643; McINTosH, N. C. PRAcrIcE AND
PROCEDURE IN CIVrM CASES (1929) 788.
Queen v. Clyde Mills Inc., I N. C. I. C. 1 (1929) (motion for non-suit a
useless procedure); Bulletin North Carolina Industrial Commission, Vol. I,"
No. I, at 11.
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record proper on appeal.58 As for (1) the opinion of the Commis-
sion is conclusive on the facts and is usually brief and concise, and
certainly there is no place to set forth complaint and answer, etc.,
since there are none. Therefore, upon appeal to the Supreme Court
it would be necessary to include in the record only the opinion of
the Commission, the judgment of the Superior Court, and the assign-
ment of errors as to the questions of law. Such a practice would be
in accord with that portion of Rule 19 of the Rules of Practice in the
Supreme Court which specifies: "It shall not be necessary to send as
a part of the transcript, affidavits, orders and other process and pro-
ceeding in the action not involved in the appeal and not necessary
to an understanding of the exception relied on."5 7
In another sentence of §60 it is stated: "The Commission, of its
own motion, may certify questions of law to the Supreme Court for
decision and determination by said court." It is doubtful if this may
be done. The sentence does not increase the authority of the court
to render advisory opinions to co6rdinate branches of the govern-
ment.5 8  Nor does it set up a procedure for declaratory judgments.5 '
It seems rather to be an attempt to create a new method of securing
advice from the appellate tribunal for the use of an inferior tribunal.
As such it resembles neither the equitable jurisdiction of the court
to quiet title6 0 and to instruct executors and trustees,61 nor the statu-
tory jurisdiction to settle and register the title of real estate under the
Torrens Act.62 These actions arise out of the instigation of parties.68
" But where the Commission has made statements in their conclusions of
law concerning burdens of proof and other rules of evidence, there might be an
assignment of error on the question of law. For examples of mention of rules
of evidence see, Helms v. Meyers Mills Inc., 1 N. C. I. C. 9, 11 (1929) ; Holtz-
claw v. Carolina Mining Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 30, 34 (1929); Logan v. Elliott
Building Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 90, 92 (1929) ; Williams v. Kitchen Lumber Co., 1
N. C. I. C. 209, 210 (1930).
' 192 . C. 847 (1926).
"In the Matter of Advisory Opinions, 196 N. C. Appendix (1929) ; Note
(1929) 7 N. C. L. Rrv. 449.
' Stated briefly the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is as follows:
"Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have the power to
declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is
or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the
ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration
may be either negative in form and effect, and such declaration shall have the
force and effect of a final decree or judgment." MCINTOSH, N. C. PRAcTicz
AND PROCEDUAB IN CIvIr. CASFS (1929) 732.
' MCINTOSH, op. cit., §upra note 57, at §24.
'London v. Pelchenan, 198 N. C. 225, 151 S. E. 189 (1930).
"N. C. Code (Michie 1927) §2377.
"As such they are semi-declaratory judgments.
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Moreover, the court has declared there must be a real controversy
and not a pro forma judgment to feel the way in doubtful litigation,0 4
that neither a feigned issue65 nor a moot question 0 will be consid-
ered. On a few occasions, however, the court has accomplished by
indirection what they declined to do directly, i.e., by saying that if
the question was before us we would hold, etc.67 To apply the can-
onized axiom of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that the courts are
created to redress private wrongs would be to declare the quoted por-
tion of §60 inoperative. To use the method of indirection would be
a half-hearted and variable declaration of its usefulness. To allow
it full force and effect would be a forward step in.procedure. 68
Contempt
In a recent case before a Commissioner, a doctor was sentenced
to ten days in jail for contempt when he refused, after testifying on
the facts in the case, to state his opinion on the connection between
the injury and the subsequent paralysis unless he was assured an
expert witness fee. This raises the interesting question of whether
or not the Industrial Commission is a court, for a consideration of
the power to punish for contempt must first be predicated on a find-
ing that there is a court.8 9
"Supra note 58; Kistler v. Southern Ry. Co., 170 N. C. 666, 79 S. E. 676
(1915).
' Parlker v. Raleigh Savings Bank, 152 N. C. 253, 67 S. E. 492 (1910).
"Supra note 58.
Burton v. Durham Realty & Ins. Co., 188 N. C. 473, 474, 125 S. E. 3
(1924) ; Reid v. Alexander, 170 N. C. 303, 87 S. E. 125 (1915) ; Farthing v.
Carrington, 116 N. C. 315, 322, 22 S. E. 9 (1895).
" Perhaps the procedure might be allowable upon an analogy to the pro-
cedure in the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal of certifying to the Supreme
Court "any questions or propositions of law concerning which instructions are
desired for the proper decision of the cause." 28 U. S. C. A. §346 and notes.
'News and Observer (Raleigh, April 9, 1930) at page 1.
The weight of authority is to the effect that an expert witness is not entitled
to demand expert witness fees before testifying to facts within his knowledge,
although it may have required professional study, learning and skill to ascertain
them. Note (1919) 2 A. L. R. 1576; (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 761. For the com-
mon law view. 4 WIGMORE, EViDETcE (2nd ed. 1923) §2203. Originally in
North Carolina the court could not fix an allowance for expert witnesses, but
by statutory enactment it may now do so. Chadwick v. Life Ins. Co. of Va.,
185 N. C. 380, 383, 74 S. E. 115 (1912) ; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §3893.
And where the witness is a witness to facts observed by him, the court may in-
the exercise of its discretion refuse an allowance of expert fees, although the
witness is called upon to express an opinion based upon his observation of the
facts in the particular case.
As a sidelight it is well to note that under §27 of the Compensation Act any
physician appearing before the Industrial Commission is deprived of his qualified
privilege concerning the communications of his patient, the injured employee.
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The Industrial Commission is given some of the powers incident
to a judicial body. If the employee and the employer fail to reach
an agreement as to compensation, a hearing before a Commissioner
is held. 70 This is open to the public and stenographically reported. 71
The Commissioner hears the parties, their representatives and wit-
nesses and determines the dispute in a summary manner. 72 "The
award, together with a statement of the findings of fact, rulings of
law and other matters pertinent to the questions at issue shall be
filed with the record of the proceeding, and a copy of the award shall
immediately be sent to the parties in dispute. a7 3 Application may
be made for a review before the full Commission of a Commission-
er's award and the full Commission may rehear the evidence, hear
new evidence, and amend or affirm the award.7 4 An appeal may be
taken from the award of the Commission, or of the Commissioner,
to the Superior Court, and in such an appeal the fact findings of the
Commission are conclusive and binding.78 A certified copy of the
award of the Commission may be filed in the Superior Court and a
judgment shall be entered in accordance therewith. 6 The Commis-
sion may assess the costs of the whole proceedings upon the party
who "brought, prosecuted or defended without reasonable grounds. '71
Moreover, in the hearing of disputed claims the Commission func-
tions as a court. Attorneys appear, present evidence, interrogate
witnesses and argue questions of law.
-On the other hand the Industrial Commission performs numerous
functions as an administrative body. It has certain legislative at-






" §61. This section has a provision that a certificate from the Commission
filed by the judgment debtor showing that he has insured his liability (under
§67) sliall be entered by the Clerk of the Superior Court upon the judgment
book and shall operate as a discharge of the lien, but if there is default in pay-
ment of any installment of an award the court (presumably the Clerk of the
Superior Court) may, "upon application for cause and ten days notice to the
judgment debtor, order the lien restored."
By §20 the rights of compensation have preference or priority against the
assets of the employer "as is allowed by law for any unpaid wages for labor."
The question arises whether §20 operates whenever by §61 there is a discharge
and a subsequent restoration of the lien.
7§62.
"§54(a), to make rules, "not inconsistent with this act, for carrying out the
provisions of this act."
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poration Commission.7 9 Nor is the Industrial Commission expressly
given the power to punish for contempt, whereas such power is
vested in the Corporation Commission.80 Moreover, in most states
such a commission as the Industrial Commission is considered as an
administrative body,81 although such bodies usually have the inci-
dents of power mentioned in the above paragraph.
If the Industrial Commission is a court, the corollary that it has
the power to punish for contempt does not automatically follow.
The Supreme Court, the Superior Courts and the Justice of the
Peace Courts are constitutional courts. 82 As such they cannot be
limited by statute in the exercise of their power to punish for con-
tempt.83 But the Industrial Commission, if a court at all, is one of
the inferior courts which, by the Constitution, the legislature is given
the power to create. Since the legislature can create and abolish in-
ferior courts, it has the power to limit such a court in the matter of
jurisdiction and authority. Therefore, it is conceivable that the
legislature might create an inferior court and specify that it should
not have the power to punish for contempt. But a failure to provide
such an express power to punish for contempt does not mean that
such a power does not exist in the court. It would seem rather to
indicate that it did have such a power.8 4 It is a necessary inference
that every court unless expressly deprived of the power, has the in-
herent right to punish for contempt.8 5 Otherwise, a court would
N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §1023. The Corporation Commission has
been called an "administrative court." Nichols, Judicial Review of the North
Carolina Corporation Commission (1924) 2 N. C. L. REv. 69, 73.
'N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §§983, 1090.
" There are conflicting views on the question of whether or not Workmen's
Compensation bodies are courts. In the majority of jurisdictions these bodies
are deemed to be only administrative in character. Devine's. Case, 236 Mass.
588, 129 N. E. 414 (1921) ; Brunette v. Brunette, 171 Wis. 366, 177 N. W. 593(1920). In some jurisdictions, however, they are recognized as judicial tribu-
nals. Cook v. Massey, 38 Idaho 264, 220 Pac. 1088, 35 A. L. R. 200 (1923);
Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407, 156 Pac. 491 (1916).
"N. C. Constitution, Art. IV, §12.
'N. C. Constitution, Art. IV, §12; Ex parte McCown, 139 N. C. 95, 51
S. E. 957 (1905). It is admitted, however, that the statutory enactment rela-
tive to contempt has deprived the constitutional courts of none of their inherent
rights on this subject.
" By N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §983, every inferior court is given the
power "to punish for contempt while sitting for the trial of causes or engaged
in official business."
" State v. Aiken, 113 N. C. 651, 652, 18 S. E. 690 (1893). And in In re
Deaton, 105 N. C. 59, 65, 11 S. E. 244 (1890), there is the following statement:
"It was contended below that a Mayor has no jurisdiction to punish for con-
tempt, because not named among the officers having that-power in the Code,
436 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
become a nullity, shackled by its impotence to preserve a semblance
of dignity.
The failure of the Act to designate the Industrial Commission a
court does not seem to indicate a legislative intent that it should not
be a court. The failure to have an express statement that the Com-
mission should be a court is perhaps chargeable rather to inadvert-
ence than to a purpose to deny it recognition as a judicial body.
The fact that the Commission is given administrative and legislative
functions does not prevent it from being a court. The fact that sub-
section (c) of §54 says that "the Superior Court shall, on the appli-
cation of the Commission or any member or deputy thereof, enforce
by proper proceedings the attendance and testimony of witnesses"
militates against the view that the Commission may punish for con-
tempt. But it is not conclusive.8 6 Moreover, a prior portion of §54
gives the Commission the power to "subpoena witnesses, administer
or cause to be administered oaths." The power given to the Superior
Court might be considered an alternative process open to the Com-
mission, for it is not expressly made the sole process. It would seem
to be in keeping with the dignity necessary to the proper discharge
of the Commission's judicial duties and powers, as well as in keeping
with the purpose of the Act, for the Supreme Court to decide that
the Industrial Commission is an inferior court invested with the
power to punish for contempt.
Sec. 651 [now N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann (1919) §983]. Apart fronv the fact that
every court inherently possesses such power independent of statutory enact-
ment, the Code, Sec. 3818 [now N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §2634] consti-
tutes the Mayor an Inferior Court, and gives him the powers of Justice of
the Peace."
"It might be said that by this section the Industrial Commission is given
the further power to ask the Superior Court to punish for contempt before the
Commission. This would be an alternate procedure and would not divest the
Commission of its power to punish. For a somewhat analagous situation in
the case of a referee or a commissioner, see Bradley Fertilizer Co. v. Taylor,
112 N. C. 141, 17 S. E. 69 (1893), and LaFontine v. Southern Underwriters
Ass'n., 83 N. C. 133 (1880).
